Fund Estimation for Disaster Management

The scale of that disaster depends on:

• Vulnerability
• Capacity

This gives us the final equation for Risk. This entire thesis is built on one fact: We can't stop the Hazard—we can't stop the rain. This project is a service design to find and fix the Vulnerability.

Disaster risk reduction is aimed at preventing new and reducing existing disaster risk and managing residual risk, all of which contribute to strengthening resilience and therefore to the achievement of sustainable development (UNDRR, 2017).

Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (SFDRR) 2015-2030 re-calibrated the focus from Hazard to Risk (defined as Risk = Hazard x Vulnerability)

Mumbai, a coastal area of 387.32 km² with over 9.3 million people, is highly vulnerable due to its geography and high population density.

The district is prone to multiple hazards like earthquakes, cyclones, and landslides. But floods are a definite annual recurring, wicked problem because they are multi-modal—caused by a mix of its vulnerabilities:

• Infrastructure: Inadequate drainage networks.
• Geography: Low-lying regions and river overflow.
• Economic: High mixed land use.
• Climatic: Heavy rainfalls and cloudbursts.

All these are exacerbated by informal settlements, siltation, and resource gaps.

The 26th of July 2005 is the benchmark disaster, defined by an unprecedented rainfall of 944.2 mm in the Suburban District, which led to the "complete disruption of normal life". This extreme event overwhelmed the city's drainage network, which is already compromised by geography, reclaimed land, and urbanization. The resulting floods caused widespread "havoc" and "huge economic losses," establishing the benchmark for Mumbai's critical flood risk.

Since the benchmark 2005 disaster, Mumbai has continued to face multiple "Flood like situations," including significant, recurring events in 2017 and 2019 that affected the entire Greater Mumbai area.

When the city of Mumbai floods, its critical infrastructure is paralyzed. In this recurring crisis, the most devastating failure is that of its public hospitals.

These facilities, the last line of defence for the populace, are often the first to be compromised—basements flood, power systems fail, and life-saving equipment is destroyed. This turns a manageable natural hazard into a full-scale urban catastrophe.

The official DM Plan mandates a comprehensive mitigation strategy, combining Structural Measures (capital investment, flood proofing) with Non-Structural Measures, including a "Safety Audit of all critical lifeline structures".

This plan is governed by the DDMA (District Disaster Management Authority), with the BMC Administrator (the Addl. Commissioner) acting as the central authority for coordination and funding.

However, the execution of this plan reveals the critical flaw: the DDMA operates using Emergency Support Functions (ESFs)— specialized, siloed teams.

This creates a Governance Void:

• ESF 6 (Health) is siloed to handle patients, while
• ESF 13 (Public Works) is siloed to handle public roads.

This structure is not designed for the inter agency problem of hospital mitigation, leaving the Administrator with no clear data channel to make objective, defensible funding decisions.